Abstract-Caching is a procedure which allows popular files to be pre-fetched and stored partly in end users' memory. In modern wireless networks, caching is emerging to play a vital role in reducing peak data rates by storing popular content. In this paper, the concept of information theoretic security for caching is introduced. A novel caching scheme is proposed which leverages both the local and global caching gains to reduce peak rate while securely delivering requested content to the users. The analysis of the secure caching problem is presented which shows that the proposed scheme introduces security at negligible cost compared to insecure caching schemes, particularly for large number of files and users. It is also shown that the rate of the proposed scheme is within a constant multiplicative factor from the information-theoretic optimal rate for all feasible values of problem parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Caching is a technique which helps in reducing the peak network load at times of high traffic volume with the aid of local file storage and content duplication. Fractions of popular files are duplicated and stored apriori in users' cache memories distributed across a given network. At times of high demand, the users can be partly served locally from their cache, thereby reducing the network load. Caching generally works in two phases -the storage phase and the delivery phase. The general caching problem has been well studied in literature [1] - [4] . In [1] , a file assignment viewpoint, analogous to the caching problem, is investigated through different models for assigning files to storage devices. The delivery phase of the caching system can operate as a series of dedicated unicast transmissions to each user by communicating fractions of requested files which are not stored in their caches. However, this is not a scalable solution as the number of users in the system increases. A more efficient solution would be multicasting to all users while simultaneously satisfying all demands. Multicast delivery can be leveraged by exploiting the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Most of the prior works in this area tend to use a fixed delivery scheme and then optimize the storage phase to suit the delivery scheme [3] , [4] . Further, the investigation is mainly based on the gains obtained from local content distribution, ignoring the global cache size as a factor for extracting caching gain.
More recently, [5] - [7] have proposed an information theoretic formulation of the caching problem. In [5] , a scheme is proposed which, in addition to the local caching gain, is also capable of offering a global caching gain. The scheme takes the cumulative size of the network cache memory into consideration and jointly designs the cache storage phase and a coded multicast delivery phase. This achieves a global caching gain which provides significant improvement over local caching gain. The fundamental concepts presented in [5] are extended in [6] , [7] to the more general scenarios of decentralized storage and non-uniform user demands [8] . Some extensions of the caching problem have also been investigated in the case of Device-to-Device (D2D) communications [9] , [10] . The authors in [10] use the interaction of cache memories of the distributed devices to enable efficient frequency reuse.
In this paper, we investigate the fundamental security aspects of the caching problem. To this end, we introduce the secure caching problem in which the multicast communication between the central server and the users (delivery phase) occurs over a public (insecure) channel. The defining feature of this problem is to capture the tradeoff between the multicast rate of the insecure link and the size of the cache memory. The main contribution of this paper is the approximate characterization of this fundamental tradeoff. While security in multicast erasure channels has been studied in [11] , to the best of our knowledge, none of the works on cache storage and placement design deal with security issues. We present novel upper and lower bounds on the memory-vs-rate tradeoff. We show that the rate of the achievable scheme is within a constant multiplicative gap from the optimal secure scheme. From our results, we show, rather surprisingly, that the cost for incorporating security (in comparison to [5] ) is negligible when the number of users and files increase. Due to space constraints, the proofs of some of the theorems stated in this paper are omitted. They are presented in detail and available online in [12] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system with a central server connected to K users through an error-free rate-limited link. The server has a database of N files denoted by (W 1 , . . . , W N ), where each file is of size F bits. For the scope of this paper, we assume that a user can request any one of the files at a given time. Each user has a cache memory Z k of size MF bits for any real number M ∈ [0, N]. Similar to [5] , the system operates over two phases: a cache storage phase and a delivery phase. In the storage phase, the cache Z k of user k is stored with some content which is a function of the files (W 1 , . . . , W N ). User k (for k = 1, . . . , K) requests access to one of the files W d k in the database. In the delivery phase, the central server proceeds by transmitting a multicast signal X (d1,...,dK ) of size RF bits over the shared link. Using the content Z k (of its cache) and the received signal X (d1,...,dK ) , the kth user intends to reconstruct 
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first result gives an achievable rate which upper bounds the optimal memory-rate trade-off R * s (M ). Security is incorporated by introducing randomness in the storage and delivery phase of the achievable scheme in form of a set of uniformly distributed orthogonal keys (independent of the data) stored in the cache of each user. The total cache memory (of size MF bits) is divided into two parts -data memory (of size M D F bits) and key memory (of size
The server uses the keys stored at the users' caches to encode the delivery signal X (d1,...,dK ) such that the transmission is secure from a wiretapper. Theorem 1. For N files and K users, each with a cache size
. , K} we have
is securely achievable. For any 1 ≤ M ≤ N , the lower convex envelope of these points is achievable.
The algorithm achieving the rate in Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A. Similar to [5] , the achievable rate in (1) consists of three factors. The first factor is K. In case of no data caching, this is worst case rate. In order to make the delivery phase secure, however, each user has to store a unique key (of the same size as a single file). During delivery, the server encodes the user's requested file with its key and transmits it. Thus even with no data storage in cache, the cache memory size has to be at least F bits to store a key. Thus in the secure problem, M = 0 is infeasible and the worst case rate is achieved at M = 1. Thus in this case
Another extreme point is M = N i.e., the case where all files are stored in the user's cache and no multicasting is required.
In this case
is achievable. We refer to a scheme which achieves points on the line joining (1, K) and (N, 0) as the conventional secure scheme. This scheme naively stores files and keys in the cache and ignores the global caching gain for 1 < M < N.
The second factor in (1) is
. This is the secure local caching gain and is relevant whenever M is of the order of N . The third factor in (1) is 1/ 1 + K · M −1 N −1 , which is the secure global caching gain. It is a multicasting gain available to all users for all possible demands. The scheme in Theorem 1 designs the placement of data content and keys in the users' cache such that coded secure multicasting can be achieved among users for every possible request
The intelligent placement of keys in the caches of the users and encoding the transmissions during delivery phase introduce security in the system.
Case 2 K > N:
In this regime, the rate is given by the minimum of the rate in Theorem 1 and the rate achieved by the conventional secure scheme [12] . Comparing Theorem 1 to ( [5] , Th.1), we can observe that the terms
However, the combination of the global and local gains leads to the rate in (1) being higher than the rate in ( [5] , Th.1) for a given value of M, N . This is a cost paid for the security in the system. Next, we present a lower bound on R * s (M ) stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. For any N ∈ N files and K
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in [12] . A novel exten- Demand:
I(X (A,B) ; A, B) = 0 (b) sion to the cut-set bound [5] is presented which incorporates the security constraint I(X (d1,...,dK ) ; W 1 , . . . , W N ) = 0 i.e., no information about the files can be obtained from a given communication from the central server. Comparing the upper bound from Theorem 1 and the lower bound in Theorem 2, the next result shows that a constant multiplicative gap exists between the optimal R * s (M ) and the achievable rate.
Theorem 3. For any N ∈ N files and K
The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in [12] . In practice the bound is much tighter and is found to be less than 5 using numerical simulations. In all cases the gap is slightly larger than the gap, 12, obtained in the case of the non-secure caching scheme in [5] . We next present a series of examples to explain the intuition behind the results and highlight the interesting features. Fig. 2(a) along with the bounds for the non-secure case from [5] . We first start with the upper bound in Theorem 1. Consider the extreme point M = 1. In this case, the cache of both users Z 1 , Z 2 only stores two unique keys K 1 , K 2 and the server transmits both the files A, B over the shared link XOR-ed with a key. Given the worst-case demand (d 1 , d 2 ) = (A, B) , the server can transmit X (A,B) = {A⊕K 1 , B⊕K 2 }. This system satisfies every possible request with rate R = 2. Thus the (M, R s ) pair (1, 2) is securely achievable. Now, at the other extreme case when M = 2, each user can cache both files and no transmission is necessary. Hence the (M, R s ) pair (2, 0) is achievable. Now we consider the intermediate case in which M = 3/2. The scheme for this scenario is depicted in Fig.  2(b) . Both the files are split into 2 equal parts: A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and B = (B 1 , B 2 ), where A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 are each of size F/2 bits. We also generate a key K 12 ∼ unif{1, . . . , 2 (F/2) } which is independent of both A, B and has the same size as the sub-files i.e., F/2 bits. In the storage phase, the server fills the caches as follows: (A,B) ; A, B = 0 which follows from the fact that the key K 12 is uniformly distributed. Thus the (M, R s ) pair (3/2, 1/2) is securely achievable. This can be seen in the secure upper bound in Fig. 2(a) . Given that the points (1, 2),(3/2, 1/2) and (2, 0) are achievable, the lines joining pairs of these points are also achievable. The points on the lines can be achieved by dividing the cache memory and transmitted signal proportionally between the caching schemes for the two endpoints. This proves the achievability of the secure upper bound in Fig 2(a) . 3
In the two user example, it can be seen that there is only a single key K 12 in the system. Thus if the key is compromised, the security of the entire system fails. The scheme proposed in Theorem 1 for general values of (N, K), however is more robust in its key management when the number of files and users increase. For larger number of users, the system is able to avoid a single point of failure by operating at an appropriate point on secure memory-rate tradeoff. We next illustrate this point through another example.
Example 2. We consider the case for N = K = 3. For this case, from Theorem 1, we have M ∈ {1, A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ), B = (B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ), C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ). We also have 3 keys in the system, K 12 , K 13 , K 23 . In this case each sub-file and key is of size F/3 bits. In general, the key K ij is placed in the caches of users i and j. The overall cache placement is as follows:
Thus each cache has size M = 5×(1/3) = 5/3, where M D = 1, M K = 2/3. Now considering a worst case request where all users request different files, (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 ) = (A, B, C) , the server can make the following transmission such that everyone can securely retrieve their requested files:
The rate for this transmission is R s = 3 × 1) is securely achievable. It can be seen from the cache contents that there are multiple keys in the system thereby avoiding a single point of failure. If a user/key is compromised, then the keys containing the users' index can be replaced with new ones or removed. Thus when the N = K = 3 system operates at this point, it is robust to key failures. In general, if we choose operating points (M, R s ) such that M K > 1/K, single points of failure in the system can be avoided. Thus based on more rigid security constraints, we can choose more keys and a greater transmission rate with lower cache memory. Thus the scheme forms an interesting memory-rate trade-off based on users' security constraints. 3 We next present the main idea behind the proof for Theorem 2 through a novel extension of the cut-set bound to incorporate the security constraint. To this end, we focus on the caching system with N = 2 files (denoted by A and B) and K = 2 users (with cache contents denoted by Z 1 and Z 2 ). Consider the scenario in which user 1 demands file A and user 2 demands file B, i.e., the demand vector is (d 1 , d 2 ) = (A, B) .
It is easy to check that using the communication X (A,B) from the central server along with the two caches Z 1 , Z 2 , both files (A, B) can be recovered. This implies the following constraint:
Next, for the communication X (A,B) to be secure, we also require the following security constraint to hold:
I A, B; X (A,B) = 0.
Using these two constraints, we next show that for any scheme, the following bound of Theorem 3 must necessarily hold:
From the constraints (6)- (7), we have the following sequence of inequalities:
= I A, B;
This implies:
Now consider the fact that given any two transmissions from the server X (A,B) , X (B,A) and one cache Z 1 both the files A, B can be recovered. Again, we have the following constraints for file retrieval and security:
Thus we have:
This implies that:
We can see that both (9) and (13) which gives the secure lower bound in Fig. 2(a) .
Next, we look at the upper bound on the optimal rate for the secure and non-secure schemes for the case when the number of files and users increase. When N = K = 20, it can be seen from Fig. 4(a) that the secure and non-secure bounds almost coincide. For very large values of N, K the bounds are practically identical. This result shows that security from a wiretapper can be achieved at almost negligible cost compared to a non-secure scheme.
The trade-off between the fraction of cache memory occupied by the data and the keys in the secure caching system is shown in Fig. 4(b) for , data memory dominates. Since the main objective of caching is to reduce traffic at peak network loads, the system should be operated at a trade-off point where the data memory dominates the key memory. Also in Example 2, we argued that single points of failure in system i.e., a single key for all users can be avoided for M K ≥ 1/K. This corresponds to t = K − 1 and M = (N − 1)(K − 1)/K + 1. Thus we propose the region of operation to be:
In general, when t ≤ K − r i.e., when M ≥ (N − 1)(K − r)/K + 1, a wiretapper can obtain all keys in the system by gaining access to any r of the K caches. Thus if r users are compromised, system security will be violated. At t = 0, M = 1 and each user has one unique key. In this case, the wiretapper will need access to all the users' caches in order to break down the security of the system. Regime 5 is the weakest from the security perspective as there is only one key in the system. Thus we should operate in Regimes 1-4.
IV. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of secure caching in the presence of an external wiretapper. We have proposed a key based secure caching strategy which is robust to compromise of users and keys. We have approximated the information theoretic optimal rate of the secure caching problem with novel upper and lower bounds. It has been shown that there is a constant multiplicative gap between the optimal and the achievable rates for the given scheme. We have also shown that for large number of files and users, the secure bounds approach that of the non-secure case i.e., the cost of security in the system is negligible when the number of files and users increase.
APPENDIX A SECURE CACHING SCHEME (PROOF OF THEOREM 1) In this section, we discuss the secure caching strategy which achieves the upper bound R s (M ) as stated in Theorem 1, Case 1. There are two phases in the caching strategy: the storage phase and the delivery phase. We consider a cache size M ≤ N and M ∈ N −1 K · {0, 1. . . . , K} + 1. Let t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} be an integer between 0 and K. The cache memory size can then be parametrized by t as:
From (15), we have t =
N −1 . Next, we break up the total cache memory into data memory and key memory, M = M D + M K , as follows:
From the discussion in Section III, we know that the conventional secure scheme achieves the (M, R s ) pair (1, min{N, K}) and (N, 0). Thus R * s (1) ≤ min{N, K} and R * s (N ) = 0. We therefore consider the case in which 1 < M < N. In this case, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1}. Storage Phase: In the placement phase each file W n for n = 1, . . . , N is split into
(17) For each n, the sub-file W n,τ is placed the cache of user k if k ∈ τ . Since |τ | = t, for each user k ∈ τ , there are t − 1 out of K − 1 possible users with whom it shares a sub-file of a given file W n . Thus each user caches N K−1 t−1 sub-files.
ICC'14 -W1: Workshop on Wireless Physical Layer Security
Next, we generate a set of keys, each of the size of a sub-file i.e. of size F/ 
which satisfies the memory constraint. transmissions and an unique key associated with each transmission i.e., there are K t+1 keys in the system. Each transmission has the size of a sub-file and thus the total number of bits sent over the rate-limited link is:
Next, we show that the delivery phase does not reveal any information to the wiretapper i.e., we show that: 
where, the last equality follows from the fact that the keys are uniformly distributed and are independent of the files (W 1 , . .
. , W N ). Using the fact that H(A, B) ≤ H(A)+H(B),
we have:
On the other hand, we have:
where the equality in (24) follows from the fact that the keys K Si , for all i are mutually independent and distributed as unif 1, 2, . . . , 2 
which proves that the rate R s (M ) is securely achievable. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
